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Silver: The Lost World: Of Politics and Getting the Law Right

THE LOST WORLD: OF POLITICS AND GETTING
THE LAW RIGHT
CharlesSilver*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Lost World is one of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's less famous
works.' Deservedly so. Better to read any Sherlock Holmes story than
this implausible tale. Its hero is the amazing Professor Challenger, who
combines the world's greatest intellect and a passionate devotion to science with a massive ego, prodigious physical strength, and a strong dose
of disdain for his inferiors. After figuring out that a natural Jurassic Park
exists on a lofty plateau somewhere in the Amazon, Challenger locates
the plateau, obtains proof that prehistoric animals still exist, and returns
to England in triumph.
As I thought about the outcry that followed the insurance industry's campaign to protect itself and the law from the ALI, Challenger's
plateau came to mind. It was a place insulated from forces at work on
the rest of the planet, such as those that wiped out the dinosaurs. ALI
members seem to think that their organization also perches far above the
fray, so that forces acting elsewhere cannot reach it. The truth is otherwise. Because the ALI is an influential body, it should expect to be a
target of interest group activity and repeatedly has been.2 Although the
ALI may see itself as sacrosanct, interest groups do not see it that way,
especially when it embarks upon a program of reform that is intended to
change settled law and to upset important economic relationships.
*

Cecil D. Redford Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful for com-

ments from Bill Barker, Kent Syverud, David Beck, Lynn Baker, Michael Sean Quinn, Bill Powers, and Ellen Smith Pryor.
1. See SiR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE LOST WORLD (1912).
2. Others have made this point before. See Address by the Honorable RichardA. Posner,
ChiefJudge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 321,
325 (1995) ("It is more and more difficult for the Institute to engage with important questions ... without crossing the line that separates technical law reform from politics.").
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The controversy surrounding section 215 of the Restatement
(Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers3 shows that interest groups can
shake up the ALI when the need arises. Insofar as I am concerned, that
is not a bad thing. In this Article, I will offer my perspective on the debate over section 215 and the related politics. I will also reflect upon the
connection between interest groups, social choice processes, and scholarship.
I1. THE IADC/DRI STUDY OF DEFENSE LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL OBLIGAT[ONS

In the summer of 1994, Kent Syverud and I received a grant from
the International Association of Defense Counsel ("IADC") and the Defense Research Institute ("DRI") to undertake the first comprehensive
academic study of the professional responsibilities of insurance defense
lawyers. The money was not good. The grant replaced summer research
funds that we would have received in any event from our law schools. It
also covered limited travel and other expenses. I could have made ten
times as much by consulting.
Even so, I was thrilled about the project, as was Kent. We knew
that it was important, and we had the right combination of skills to
make it a success. Kent studied the law and economics of liability insurance, was the author of the leading article on the duty to settle,4 and
taught professional responsibility on the side. I had recently decided to
make the study of lawyering a full-time endeavor, and I also had a
background in liability insurance. Plus, both of us taught and wrote
about complex litigation and civil procedure. It was easy for us to see
how insurance, professional responsibility, and procedure intertwined.
We were (and are) also great friends.
The only thing we lacked was experience. Fortunately, the IADC
and DRI members who were to work with us had plenty of that. They
were long-time insurance defense lawyers, coverage attorneys, and
counsel for insurance companies who had access to all of the factual information about claims handling procedures, insurance policies, defense
practices, and policyholder concerns we could want.
They were smart too. David Beck, the chair of the IADC's Special
•Committee on Professionalism and the original proponent of the study,

3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Council Draft
No. 13, 1997).
4. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990).
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was the author of a monograph on Texas legal malpractice law. Ron
Mallen co-authored the leading treatise on legal malpractice, which
contained a lengthy chapter on insurance defense. Dick Neumeier edited the Defense Counsel Journaland had written an article on defense
ethics.7 Bill Barker, a closet academic, was the leading lawyercommentator on procedural issues in insurance litigation and the author
of numerous articles.8 Michael Pope, then the head of the LADC, and
John Biancheri, of Continental Insurance, published an exchange discussing professionalism issues from their respective sides.9 Louis Potter,
the recently deceased and greatly missed Executive Director of the DRI,
was at the center of the storm surrounding Atlanta InternationalInsurance Co. v. Bell,'0 a Michigan case that tore the DRI apart. Ed Schrenk,
legal counsel for United Services Automobile Association, was a moving force for professionalism in the industry and is one of the most
savvy lawyers I know. The other members-there were at least ten more
of them-were no less able, no less analytical, and no less familiar with
the great battles of the day. They knew so much and were so thoughtful
that I felt as though I was under a microscope. I knew I'd have to work
hard just to keep up with the group, much less to impress them. I also
knew that flaws in my work were likely to be discovered and condemned.
It seemed to me that the project could not fail to improve the way
lawyers, judges, and academics thought about the professional responsibilities of insurance defense lawyers. With luck, it would advance
their thinking considerably. Having studied the subject carefully in
1993," I knew that it was ripe for reconceptualizing. A large and basically sound body of case law had developed over the century-long period during which liability insurance has been sold in this country. Unfortunately, a sizeable number of aberrant cases spoiled the landscape.
5. See David J. Beck, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 43A BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1991).
6. See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 28.1-.26 (4th
ed. 1996).
7. See Richard L. Neumeier, Serving Two Masters: Problems Facing Insurance Defense
Counsel and Some ProposedSolutions, 77 MAss. L. REV. 66 (1992).
8. See William T. Barker, Insurability of Punitive Damages, COVERAGE, Mar.-Apr. 1995,
at 36; William T. Barker & Michael A. Barnes, The Standard for First-Party Bad Faith,
COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 17; William T. Barker, What's New and Important in Bad Faith,
COVERAGE, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 40.
9. See Michael A. Pope & John J. Biancheri, Of Lawyering and Bean Counting: Yes, the
Twain Can Meet, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 433 (1994).
10. 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991).
11. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583 (1994).
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There was also considerable confusion about the basics, such as the
number of clients a defense lawyer represents and whether a lawyer
owes a higher duty of loyalty to a policyholder than an insurer. The task
ahead of Kent and me was to answer these basic questions in a coherent
way that helped sort out the cases and to persuade first the members of
the committee and then the larger legal community that we were right.
An impressive body of literature made our job easier than it might
have been. In the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, Professor (now Judge) Robert
E. Keeton published a series of foundational articles on liability insurance that identified and explained the major doctrinal developments and
offered cogent ways of thinking about the defense and settlement of insured claims.' 2 We could also draw upon a wealth of specialized Reporters, articles by lawyers, scholarly treatises, Robert Jerry's thoughtful
book, Understanding Insurance Law, 3 and the works by Ron Mallen
and Bill Barker mentioned above. 4 Although we had to use these
building blocks with care, we did not have to start from scratch.
The project was also greatly helped by an insight Ron Mallen expressed at the first committee meeting that Kent and I attended. Mallen
saw that it would be better to start with a separate assessment of fullcoverage representations instead of throwing excess exposure and disputed coverage cases into the mix. His argument was that full-coverage
cases are both more common and more basic than limited- or disputedcoverage situations, and that defense lawyers' responsibilities can be
discussed more clearly without the overlay of coverage issues. The
longer we worked on the project, the more certain we were that Mallen

was right.
What happened after that is a blur. Kent and I produced short
working drafts of arguments and partial sections of the final report. The
committee members read them and, at meetings held every few months,
took them apart. The discussions were freewheeling. Usually, they were
friendly and respectful, but often they were heated, and more than a few
shouting matches occurred. The disagreements neither surprised nor
dismayed Kent and me. We knew that the stakes were great, and we
reveled in the clash of ideas. We also knew that we were educating the
members, and that they were teaching us. All of us lost arguments from
time to time, all of us had to think more deeply about the issues than we
12. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1136 (1953-1954); Robert E. Keeton, Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance
Claims, 70 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1956-1957).
13. RoBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (1987).

14. See supra notes 6, 8.
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ever did before, and Kent and I had to make innumerable revisions.
What made the committee's deliberations truly remarkable was the
freedom Kent and I enjoyed to say and write whatever we wanted. The
members hit us from all directions and refused to relent until we responded to their arguments and complaints, but it was always clear that
they expected us to make up our own minds. We were supposed to do
our best to get the facts, the theory, and the law right, whatever our final
conclusions might be. It was an academic experience in the best sense,
an ongoing colloquium with no predetermined right answer and no date
by which the debate had to end. The quality of our final report, a version
of which appeared as an article in the Duke Law Journal,reflects the
committee's collective desire to get to the bottom of things. 5
I will always be grateful to the members of the Special Committee
on Professionalism. They were reliable sounding boards for ideas, wonderful sources of insights and advice, and true professionals. Without
them, I could not have made the most of the opportunity the IADC and
the DRI gave me to do sustained scholarship in this important field.

III. SILVER FAILS TO PERSUADE THE REPORTERS
Two events led David Beck to see that the time was right for a
scholarly project on defense lawyering. The first was the Michigan Su-6
preme Court's decision in Atlanta InternationalInsurance Co. v. Bell.1
The second was The American Law Institute's release of a draft of sec-7
tion 215 of the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers.
Atlanta Internationalgenerated considerable uncertainty among defense
lawyers by holding as a matter of law that no attorney-client relationship existed between a defense lawyer and a defending insurer. The
rule had long been otherwise, as Mallen's treatise makes clear. 9 Shortly
thereafter, the ALI promulgated Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, in which section 215 also
indicated that an insurance defense lawyer represents only an insured.20
These events caused considerable turmoil among defense lawyers and

15. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The ProfessionalResponsibilities of Insurance Defense Lanyers, 45 DUKE LJ. 255 (1995).
16. 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991).
18. See Atlanta Int'l, 475 N.W.2d at 297.
19. See MALLEN & SMrrH, supranote 6, § 28.3, at 487-90.
20. See RESTATFMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmL. a (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
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liability carriers. In 1993, the Federation of Insurance and Corporate
Counsel devoted an entire21meeting to the subject of professionalism in
an effort to sort things out.
Some people think that the issue of greatest concern to defense
lawyers and insurers was the right of primary carriers to assert legal
malpractice claims. To believe this is to misunderstand their fears. The
most pressing issue was whether insurers could continue to work handin-glove with defense lawyers, as they had for decades. Insurers rarely
sue defense lawyers, but hundreds or thousands of times every day they
rely on them to protect their financial interests, to keep confidences, to
provide sound advice on trial strategies and settlement opportunities,
and to follow instructions. For insurance companies, defense lawyers
have value because they can be expected to defend policyholders zealously while also loyally and diligently protecting insurers.
Atlanta International and section 215 of the Restatement threatened to tear apart these close working relationships. If carriers were not
clients, what right did they have to receive or impart confidences, to
give instructions, to regulate defense budgets, or to rely on defense lawyers for unbiased advice? If the policyholder was the only person a defense lawyer represented, shouldn't the lawyer be concerned about and
loyal to the policyholder alone? And shouldn't the policyholder be in
charge of the defense? It is black letter law that a non-client, third-party
payor has no right to interfere with a lawyer's representation of a client.' How, given this, could it be right for insurance companies to exert
so much influence over the representation of insureds?
These were the questions lawyers and insurers were asking. Defense lawyers were in a no-win situation. They could ignore Atlanta Internationaland section 215 and continue on as they had before. Or they
could change the way they did business with insurers. The first option
put them in danger of being charged with unprofessionalism. The second forced them to risk alienating their largest sources of business. Insurance companies faced a similar predicament. By carrying on as before, they faced the prospect of being sued for breach of the duty to
defend and bad faith. By putting greater distance between their defense
lawyers and themselves, they would lose valuable claims-handling
services and enjoy less control of defense and settlement costs. Altanta
21.

See Scott L. Machanic, InsuranceDefense Counsel: Who Is the Client?, 43 FED'N INS. &
Q. 45,47-48 (1992).
22. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f)(2) (1998) (prohibiting thirdparty payor relationships unless "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship").
CORP. CouNs.
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Internationaland section 215 were trouble for everyone, including policyholders who would have to pay higher premiums to cover increased
costs.
There was little Kent and I could do about Atlanta International,
but we thought we could do a lot with the ALI. The Restatement was
years away from becoming final, so there was plenty of time to communicate with Professors John Leubsdorf, Thomas Morgan, and Charles
Wolfram, the Reporters. Although neither of us knew any of the Reporters well, we had great regard for them. By corresponding with them and
providing them copies of our working drafts, we hoped to improve their
understanding of insurance defense issues as we improved our own. As
academics, they would then naturally change section 215 to conform to
their new views.
We were optimistic about our future dealings with the Reporters
partly because they knew little about liability insurance or insurance defense practices. We thought they would see us as doing them a favor by
plowing this field. Although we were fascinated by insurance issues, we
had no illusions that others were. Insurance is more fun than a tonsillectomy, but it's not for everyone.
Things got off to a good start. Kent and I wrote the Reporters as
soon as the IADC/DRI project commenced, telling them who we were
and what we were up to and identifying our source of support. We also
sent them copies of articles we prepared for a symposium issue of the
Texas Law Review on bad faith law.2' They responded warmly and we
soon learned that Professor Morgan had the lead on section 215. We
therefore directed future correspondence to him with copies to the other
Reporters and to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the Director of the ALI.
Soon thereafter, and despite the best of intentions on all sides, progress stopped. We made little headway with Professor Morgan through
the end of 1994. The stumbling block was a matter that seemed uncontroversial to me and that had nothing to do with insurance law, in the
first instance at least. It was whether the nature of a defense lawyer's
relationship with a primary carrier is fixed by law or by agreement when
the lawyer is retained. To me, the latter alternative seemed (and still
seems) correct. It comports with agency law and with the cases on attorney-client relationships, both of which hold that principal-agent relationships arise by mutual consent. 4 It is also the only option supported
23. See Silver, supra note 11; Kent D. Syvenid, On the Demandfor Liability Insurance, 72
TEx. L. REv. 1629 (1994).
24. See R-T Leasing Corp. v. Ethyl Corp., 484 F. Supp. 950, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[A]n
attorney-client relationship necessarily demands consent and cooperation of both parties .... ),
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by section 26 of the Restatement, which identifies judicial appointment
and mutual consent as the only means of creating attorney-client relationships.' 5
It took me awhile to persuade Professor Morgan on this point. He
did, however, finally agree that an insurance company and a defense
lawyer can decide for themselves whether the lawyer is to act as counsel
for the company only, as counsel for the company and the insured, or as
counsel for the insured alone. By selecting the last option, a carrier assumes the position of a third-party payor.26
With that matter resolved, I felt confident that we could move
ahead. I therefore sent Professor Morgan a letter laying out what I perceived to be the implications of our agreement for the Restatement. I
suggested several changes designed to make explicit the possibility that
a defending insurance company can be a client and to eliminate what I
perceived as the Restatement's de jure assignment of insurers to the
category of third-party payor.
Professor Morgan did not respond to my letter as I expected. In a
courteous but brief reply, he stated that nothing in the Restatement
needed to be changed because nothing prevented an insurer from being
a co-client instead of a third-party payor. This seemed plainly wrong to
me. The only extensive discussion of insurance defense ethics was
found in section 215, entitled "Fee Payment by a Third Person.""7 The
text of this section did not state that a defending liability carrier could
be anything but a third-party payor, and the title suggested that one
could not be. There was also a public statement by the Reporters that in
af'd, 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980); United States ex rel Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683,
687 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ("An attorney-client relationship is created by the grace of the client and
consent of the attorney."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1984) (stating that mutual
consent between the principal and agent is necessary for an agency relationship to be created).
25. See RESTATEMENT (HI1mD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
26. The most recent version of section 215 endorses this view:
(1) A lawyer may not represent a client under circumstances in which someone
other than the client will wholly or partly compensate the lawyer for the representation,
unless the client consents... with knowledge of the circumstances and conditions of
the payment.
(2) A lawyer's professional conduct on behalf of a client may be directed by someone other than the client when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as by reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the lawyer; and
(b) the client consents to the direction ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Council Draft No. 13, 1997).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THID)OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991).
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representations falling under section 215 "the lawyer represents the client and not the fee payer." '
No other section of the Restatement corrected the impression that a
defending liability carrier could be only a third-party payor. Section
209, which set out the law governing conflicts of interests between coclients, said nothing about insurance defense representations." Section
26, which discussed the consensual nature of attorney-client relationships, did not indicate that a defending primary carrier could become a
client by mutual agreement.
It seemed to me that Professor Morgan had conceded a point that
required a sea change in the Restatement. The mistaken impression that
all insurance defense representations fell under section 215, and under
this section alone, had to be erased by explicitly recognizing a liability
carrier's right to be a defense lawyer's client. Moreover, if Professor
Morgan really believed that insurers could be clients as well as thirdparty payors, what harm could there be in saying so in the Restatement?
Two knowledgeable readers and the lawyers and insurance companies
they worked with were worried that the document would predispose
judges to treat insurers as non-client, third-party payors. If the Reporters
did not want this to happen, why not change the draft to make the point
clearer?
It is not as though the point was a small one. Every professional responsibility teacher knows that there is a world of difference between
being a client and not being one. Lawyers owe clients many duties, but
they owe non-clients few. Most importantly, the duty of loyalty runs
only to clients. A lawyer who represents co-clients may not assist one at
the expense of the other, but a lawyer may and even must put a sole client's interests ahead of those of a third-party payor.3" The long and short
of it was (and is) that if carriers can be clients, defense lawyers can
continue working with them as before. If they cannot be clients, insurance defense practices must change radically. It was therefore crucial
that the Restatement recognize the right of insurance companies to become clients by agreement.
Recent versions of section 215 make this acknowledgment.3 2 How
28. Actions Taken with Respect to Drafts Submitted at 1992 Annual Meeting, A.L.I. REP.,
Oct. 1992, at 4, 13.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209 (Council Draft
No. 11, 1995).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Tentative Draft

No. 5, 1992).
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rules 1.7-.8 (1998).
32. See RESTATE~MEN (THiRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 (Proposed Joint
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this and other language came to be included is an interesting story, the
details of which are better known to the Reporters and Bill Barker than
to me. However, I am reasonably certain that my correspondence with
Professor Morgan prompted few of the changes. Although I occasionally wrote the Reporters and sent them publications after receiving the
last letter from Professor Morgan mentioned above, I did little in the
way of talking substance with them after 1994. I had lost hope of persuading them to change the Restatement, and the IADC/DRI project was
occupying far too much of my time. I focused on finishing the fullcoverage project, which Kent and I completed in May 1995, and on preparing a draft for submission to a law journal later that year.
IV.

SILVER COMES UNGLUED

The article Kent and I wrote was published by the Duke Law Journal at the end of 1995."3 It is the longest scholarly work on the professional responsibilities of insurance defense lawyers and the most comprehensive. The article is a single source that scholars, lawyers, and
judges can turn to for a thorough introduction to the subject and for help
with a host of practical problems. The basics are thoroughly canvassed,
including the functions served by essential provisions of standard liability contracts, 4 the means by which primary carriers acquire the power to
appoint defense lawyers for insureds," the number of clients defense
lawyers represent,36 the source and content of insurers' right to control
the defense,37 and the duty to communicate information to carriers and
insureds.38 Related and advanced topics are also taken up. Is a defending
liability carrier a policyholder's fiduciary? Or may the carrier properly
consider its own interests, including its interest in controlling defense
costs, rather than just the interests of its insured?39 Can a defense lawyer
ever impeach a policyholder's testimony on the stand?4" Must defense
lawyers obtain conflict waivers in all cases? If not, when must they get
them? 41These questions, and many others, are addressed.

Movants'-Reporters' Amendment), reprintedin 73 A.L.I. PROC. 925 (1996).
33. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 15.
34. See id. at 269.
35. See id. at 280.
36. See id. at 273.
37. See id at 284-85.
38. See id at 299.
39. See id. at 286.
40. See id at 316.
41. See id at 334.
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The article operates on two levels: doctrinal and theoretical. At the
doctrinal level, it performs the ordinary but crucial tasks of identifying
the principles that govern particular matters and parsing the cases and
other materials in which the principles are set out. At the theoretical
level, the article offers a rich normative account of what defense lawyering is and should be about. The account draws upon the law and economics of insurance, principal-agent relationships, and professional responsibility. It also draws upon information we collected about the
manner in which insurance companies and defense lawyers handle liability claims.
The normative account of defense lawyering characterizes the lawyer as an agent who is brought into an existing legal and economic relationship between a policyholder and a carrier pursuant to the bargain
they struck and for the purpose of giving that bargain effect. The bargain is the liability insurance contract, the relevant functions of which
are to transfer the financial risks and costs associated with liability
claims from the policyholder to the carrier and to provide the carrier the
tools it needs to minimize these risks and costs. The toolbox contains,
among other things, the right to control the defense, discretion to settle
(usually without the consent of the insured), discretion to investigate,
and the policyholder's duty of cooperation. Insurance companies engage
defense attorneys in the course of employing one of these tools-the
right to control the defense-and for the purpose of getting full value
from all of them. In other words, they hire defense lawyers as part of the
effort to minimize payouts on liability claims and with the expectation
that defense lawyers will further this effort. They do not hire defense
lawyers for any other purpose. In particular, they do not expect defense
lawyers to prevent them from using the tools effectively or to provide
legal services that are not covered by the insurance contract and for
which their policyholders have not been charged.
This normative account of the defense lawyer's role rests on important foundational principles. One principle is that the terms of insurance
contracts identified above are enforceable. This is a matter governed by
insurance law. Another is that an insurance company and a defense lawyer have considerable freedom to set the terms and scope of the lawyer's engagement as they wish. This is a matter of agency law and professional responsibility law. Both principles seem to me to be
propositions of law that are true (in the sense that the cases actually embrace them) and sound (in the sense that they are supported by compelling reasons).
The normative account of the defense lawyer's role has important
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implications. Chief among them are that the terms of the lawyer's engagement are (1) that the carrier will instruct the lawyer; (2) that the
policyholder will not instruct the lawyer; (3) that the lawyer will defend
the liability claim; (4) that the lawyer will not deliver other services,
such as coverage advice or assistance with the insured's affirmative
claims, to the carrier or the insured, except perhaps by separate arrangement; and (5) that the lawyer will provide the carrier all information received from any source that bears materially on the defense or
settlement of the liability claim. Terms (3) and (4) are the subject of little debate. Terms (1), (2), and (5) are more controversial.
For present purposes, my aim is not to convince readers of the
merits of our specific conclusions but to focus attention on the structure
of the argument Kent and I laid out. The argument is systematic. It begins with a foundational understanding of insurance contracts and
agency relationships, and it builds to conclusions on the basis of careful
readings of legal materials and reliable factual information about insurance practices. This structure of argument is as important a contribution
to the literature on professionalism as the particular conclusions Kent
and I embrace. The structure sets a standard for well-crafted arguments
in this field. No longer can one say "I read the cases and the rules, therefore I have intelligent things to say about defense lawyers' obligations."
Instead, one must have a deep theory of the field that generates and justifies one's conclusions, that makes them coherent, and that sorts the
cases and other sources of doctrine into the good and the bad. Anything
less seems shallow and ad hoc.
The reader may now see why I blew my stack when I read Council
Draft No. 11 of the Restatement, which was released in late September
1995.4' The account of defense lawyers' professional duties contained
therein was completely ad hoc.43 Some elements of the account were
right, many were badly wrong, and none of it fit together in anything
approaching a thoughtful way. The language reflected fundamental misreadings of cases and a complete absence of anything that might be
considered a view of the field. A Restatement of The Law Governing
Lawyers modeled after Council Draft No. 11 could easily have changed
the landscape of the law governing insurance defense lawyers, which
really needed only weeding and pruning.
Having corresponded with the Reporters previously and having
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Council Draft No. 11,
1995).
43. See Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, All Clients Are Equal, but Some Are More
Equal than Others: A Reply to Morgan and Wolfram, COVERAGE, May-June 1996, at 47, 48-49.
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sent them copies of my articles, it was clear to me that I would accomplish little by sending them a critique of Council Draft No. 11. This belief was strengthened by the fact that before releasing the Council Draft,
the Reporters never contacted Kent, me, or anyone else working on the
IADC/DRI project to discuss section 215, even though they knew of our
considerable interest in it and even though Ron Mallen and others were
members of the ALI. As I wrote in an exchange with Professors Morgan
and Wolfram:
[Their] signal mistake was in promulgating Council Draft No. 11 and
pushing it through the Council of the ALI without giving the interested
public an opportunity to review or comment on revised § 215. They
offered the Council Draft to the world as afait accompli, leaving [me]
4
no choice but to criticize their work publicly and rally the opposition.
With the appearance of Council Draft No. 11, push came to shove.
Those of us who cared about the field and had carefully worked our way
through it had to choose. We could attack section 215 in courts and advisory committees across the country after Council Draft No. 11 became
Final Draft No. 1, knowing that we would lose many battles and maybe
the war. Or we could make a stand against section 215 in the ALI and
possibly keep the war from starting. We chose the latter course.
I supported the effort to prevent section 215 from becoming final
by providing some of the ordnance needed to fight effectively. Everyone understood that our opposition to the Council Draft was and had to
be principled. The point was to get the law right, not to flex muscles.
Because we had spent years studying the professional responsibilities of
insurance defense lawyers, our group had a large supply of arguments in
store. We needed only to draft a manifesto and an alternative to section
215 for use in rallying the troops.
It turned out to be an easy matter to prepare a manifesto. By coincidence, Michael Sean Quinn joined me as a colleague at the University
of Texas School of Law around the time Council Draft No. 11 came out.
Michael was the perfect person to work with. He had a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, one of the country's outstanding departments. As a lawyer, he had handled insurance coverage
and bad faith cases for more than ten years. He had also published
widely on insurance law. Michael was bright, literate, funny, a veteran
of litigation wars, a good fellow, an entertaining speaker, and a person
with good connections to insurance lawyers, insurance companies, and

44. Id. at 50.
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editors of journals that published articles on insurance law.
In no time, Michael got up to speed on the issues and had us engaged to publish a series of articles in Coverage, a review that reaches
an audience of insurance lawyers. We intended the essays to be as subtle as a poke in the eye. The first article, Wrong Turns on the Three Way
Street: Dispelling Nonsense About Insurance Defense Lawyers," was a
wide-ranging attack on views we thought dotty, including some expressed by Professor Hazard in a newspaper interview. 46 The aggressive
tone of this article prompted two readers to complain. When the editor
published their letters, we filed a lengthy response that was even more
inflammatory, which was also published.47
Having warmed up the readership, we submitted Are Liability
CarriersSecond-Class Clients? No, but They May Be Soon-A Call to
Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers.43
The title was the tamest part of the piece. To balance the presentation,
the editor invited Professors Morgan and Wolfram to respond.49 After
receiving their comment, the editor asked us for a reply. We gladly accommodated. Carrying forward the message that the Restatement
treated liability insurers shabbily, we drew on the novel Animal Farm'
and titled our rejoinder All Clients Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal
than Others."
When I reread the Coverage essays prior to writing this piece, I
was pleased with them. Their tone is polemical, but their content is
analytical and their force is overwhelming. It could not be clearer, to me
at any rate, that we had a coherent position supported by sound first
principles and a careful reading of the cases and that Professors Morgan
and Wolfram did not. The Reporters got insurance law wrong. They
took positions in section 215 that conflicted with basic principles set out

45. Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Wrong Turns on the Three Way Street: Dispelling
Nonsense About InsuranceDefense Lawyers, COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 1.
46. See Richard Connelly, ProfessorSwims Against Tide on Insurance Defense Question,
TEX. LAW., June 19, 1995, at 1.
47. Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Letters to the Editor, COVERAGE, Jan.-Feb. 1996,
at 4 (responding to Letters to the Editor of Coverage by Raymond B. Green and William G.
Christopher published in Coverage).
48. Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability CarriersSecond-Class Clients?No,
but They May Be Soon-A Call to Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing
Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 21.
49. See Thomas D. Morgan & Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyers Retainedby Liability Carriers
to Represent Insureds in the Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar.-Apr.
1996, at 44.
50. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMALFARM (1946).
51. See Silver & Quinn, supranote 43.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss3/11

14

Silver: The Lost World: Of Politics and Getting the Law Right
1998]

THE LOST WORLD

in other sections. They recommended special rules of professionalism
for insurance defense lawyers while citing cases that held defense lawyers to ordinary rules. They ignored long-standing authorities. They
used technical terms loosely. They missed important distinctions, running together information that bears on insurance coverage only with
information that also bears on the defense or settlement of liability
claims. They identified five questions as basic while seeming to pluck
them out of thin air.
The Reporters were greatly offended by the Coverage articles. I
have been told that they were especially angry about the uses made of
deposition testimony Professor Wolfram gave as an expert witness in a
legal malpractice case against an insurance defense lawyer 2 I shall
therefore explain why we used the deposition. We hoped to accomplish
two things. First, we wanted to give insurance carriers and defense lawyers a taste of the future that awaited them in bad faith and related malpractice cases if the Restatement became law in its then-current form.
The point of the essays was to motivate readers to take a stand against
section 215. An obvious way to arouse them was by showing them that
their self-interest was at stake. Second, we wanted to highlight the fact
that the Reporters were flat wrong about defense lawyers' duties. How
better to do that than by setting out Professor Wolfram's sworn testimony and pointing out his mistakes? These seem like legitimate uses of
deposition testimony to me, for I can only assume that Professor Wolfram gave the jury the benefit of his sincerely held and most reflective
opinions.
With the articles in place, the time was right for a speaking tour. I
gave more public presentations and participated in more debates than I
can remember. Some of these occurred at continuing legal education
programs. Others took place at meetings of insurance companies or their
trade associations. Often, Ed Schrenk and Jon Palmquist of USAA
planned the insurance company activities. Still other presentations were
sponsored by private bar associations, such as the IADC, the Texas Association of Defense Counsel, and the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. A
Texas law firm with a large insurance practice invited me to address an
audience of almost one thousand claims adjusters. I weighed in on
Counsel Connect, an on-line forum for lawyers. I was compensated for
few of these engagements, but this was academic work, not consulting. I
was educating people about the professional responsibilities of defense
lawyers and the dangers posed by the Restatement, and I was hoping
52. See Silver & Quinn, supranote 48, at 24.
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that they would consider taking steps on their own.
Other than writing the Coverage essays and giving lectures, my
role in the battle to change the Restatement was small. From time to
time I discussed strategy at meetings of the IADC's Professionalism
Committee, but I usually just reminded members of my failed efforts to
influence the Reporters. Sometimes, I offered the names of ALI members who might be enlisted to help the cause. I also commented on letters Bill Barker sent to the Reporters and drafts of amendments to section 215 that he prepared.
I also tried, without success, to convince two ALI members not associated with the IADC/DRI to consider offering a motion to amend
section 215."3 The person we most wanted to sponsor the amendment
was Judge Keeton. Although we had not corresponded with him previously, we were confident that he would side with us on the merits, our
views being close to his. We also thought that section 215 would be
doomed if he led the opposition. Most ALI members probably knew little about section 215, did not regard it as a priority, and would not be
impressed by an industry-led movement against it. But Judge Keeton
could cause many to sit up and take notice. He was a giant in the field
who could not be dismissed as a crackpot or written off as an industry
shill.
Judge Keeton agreed that insurance defense issues were treated
poorly in Council Draft No. 11 .In the end, he chose to sponsor his own
amendment. From our perspective, that was as good or better than an
offer to put his name on the text Bill Barker prepared because it put
more distance between him and our group. Keeton's motion would have
deleted all references to insurance issues from the text and amended
uses made of agency concepts m On learning that Judge Keeton would
play an active role, I became confident of winning a floor fight in the
ALI.
Even so, I did not look forward to the confrontation. To the contrary, I took steps to avoid it. I contacted Professor Charles Alan
Wright, the President of the ALI and a colleague at the University of
Texas School of Law. I gave him my views on section 215, told him
that trouble was brewing, and urged him to give the matter his attention.
I also asked him to arrange a meeting between the Reporters and repre53. The individuals were Professor Charles Reitz of the University of Pennsylvania, who had
offered sensible criticisms of section 215 in prior ALI debates, and Sheldon Raab, a New York
attorney with a special interest in professionalism.
54. Memorandum from Robert E. Keeton to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI (Apr. 29,
1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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sentatives of the IADC/DRI. He declined to do so, partly because of an
upcoming trip. I do not know whether he regrets this decision, but I do
know that he was offended by the "get out the vote" campaign that the
insurance industry later launched against section 215.
Other ALI members were also put off. Because I do not belong to
the ALI, I did not attend the May 1995 meeting at which the drama
played itself out. My knowledge of members' reactions derives from
press accounts of the meeting and from conversations with ALI members like Gibson Gayle, Esq. Mr. Gayle is a great supporter of my law
school and other causes, an outstanding lawyer, and an adjunct professor of legal professionalism whose opinions I find helpful and illuminating. Like many Texans of his generation, he is an expert at applying the
smell test and has an abundance of good sense. Although Mr. Gayle was
interested in the merits of section 215, he regarded the industry's effort
to prevent its passage as foul play, and he told me so plainly. I hope I
have made it clear to him (and other ALI members) that the "get out the
vote" campaign was a last step taken by serious, principled people after
efforts to work with the Reporters failed. It was the only way we could
see to preserve the integrity of an important body of law.
Also in an effort to avoid the confrontation, Bill Barker, one of the
true heroes of this story, strove to build a relationship with the Reporters
and to draft a replacement for section 215. Having burned my bridges
by publishing the Coverage articles, I could not handle this task. Bill, by
contrast, was perfect for it. He knew the final IADC/DRI report inside
and out and contributed important insights to it. His own works on insurance procedure and professionalism were both numerous and outstanding. He was unflappable, in person and in print. And in the
IADC/DRI committee he had often demonstrated adeptness at finding
compromises that maintained the integrity of the analysis while addressing valid concerns. Bill worked tirelessly to close the gap before the
ALI's summer meeting. He almost succeeded, as he explains in his
contribution to this Symposium, but not before the "get out the vote"
campaign was launched.55
V. THE DIFFICULT MADE (NEARLY) IMPOSSIBLE
I feel justified in describing the IADC/DRI project and the articles
that came out of it as academic works. The contract with the sponsors
gave Kent Syverud and me complete freedom to write what we wished
55. See William T. Barker, Lobbying and The American Law Institute: The Example of InsuranceDefense, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (1998).
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and to use our ideas as we saw fit. The sponsors had the right to end the
project early subject to a minimum funding constraint, a copyright in
the final report, and the right to require us to disclaim that our opinions
carried their endorsement. When I sent for review the article that later
appeared in the Duke Law Journal, I was confident that I had maintained my academic independence and integrity. I continue to feel that
way. No one but us had any power to control the text, and we put our
reputations as scholars behind everything we said.
My judgment of the scholarly quality of the essays is reflected in
the opinions of others. After the Duke Law Journal article came out,
Professor Mary Daly and Dean Michael Kadens, then the chairs of, respectively, the Professional Responsibility and Insurance Law Sections
of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"), asked me to
run a joint program on the ethics of defense lawyering. I agreed on
condition that scholars with diverse views participate. The invitees included, inter alia, Professors Tom Baker, Robert Jerry, Nancy Moore,
Tom Morgan, and Stephen Pepper, all of whom I expected to disagree
with me. Professor Morgan was responsible for section 215 and was my
opponent in the Coverage debate. 6 Professor Baker had written an article that took a pro-policyholder position on claims handling." Professor
Jerry argued with my position at length in the revised edition of Understanding Insurance Law," a draft of which I had read and commented
upon. Professor Moore backed the quasi-client approach to professional
ethics that I attacked in my Texas Law Review article in 1994." Professor Pepper, who crossed swords with me on Counsel Connect, was (and
is) convinced that I have a deeply flawed understanding of professional
responsibility law.
The cast did not let me down. The debate is a model of the sharpness and clarity with which opposing viewpoints can be posed. No one
who reads the essays, which are to be published in the Connecticut Insurance Law Journalm is likely to accuse me of making things easy on
myself. If I am guilty of anything, it is of being insufficiently strategic.
For a short time, I had the field largely to myself. Now it is crowded
with scholars whose thoughtful positions are at odds with my own.

56. See Morgan & Wolfram, supra note 49.
57. See Tom Baker, Constructing the InsuranceRelationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories,
and Insurance ContractDamages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1395 (1994).
58. See JERRY, supra note 13.
59. See Silver, supra note 11, at 1602-03.
60. See Symposium: Liability Insurance Conflicts and ProfessionalResponsibility, 4 CONN.
INs. L.J. 1 (1997-1998).
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Disagreement is a hallmark of academic debate and a source of
scholarly progress. Consensus is fine when scholars independently
reach the same conclusions, but academic debates that generate real insights and that stir people to think are successes whether or not consensus is reached. By contrast, without some level of consensus, there cannot be a Restatement, for a Restatement becomes final when approved
by the ALI. The consensus need not be complete. A majority of the
Council and the voting members can bind the ALI. This raises interesting questions. First, is a Restatement a scholarly writing or a piece of
legislation? Second, what incentives does the ALI's approval mechanism create and are its voting rules, like other social choice mechanisms, manipulated for the sake of self-interest?
Taking the second question first, I begin by noting that Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott have studied the ALI's voting rules from a
social choice perspective. 1 Their conclusions give one little reason to
hope for Restatements that are models of analytical clarity or coherence,
although they do not rule out the possibility. Schwartz and Scott depict
the ALI as an institution captured by organized interest groups that use
their dominance to control the content of ALI products. Capture, they
contend, explains why "Article 9 [of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC")] explicitly 'purports to promote the interests of those industries that helped create and lobby for it,"' and why "opposition from the
railroad and insurance industries" led to the exclusion of regulations on
railroad car trusts and insurance from the original Article 9.62 It also accounts for the failure of the Corporate Governance Project to restrict the
discretion directors have to block hostile takeover bids, despite an academic consensus in support of limiting rules. Opposition from corporate6
counsel and their employers caused the Reporters to back down. 1
Schwartz and Scott also cite capture as the reason that Article 3 of the
UCC elevates the interests of organized bankers above those of disorganized consumers. Organized banking interests were well-represented
in the ALI; disorganized consumers were not.6
If Schwartz and Scott are right about the extent of interest group
activity within the ALI, there is nothing unique about the insurance industry's campaign to defeat section 215. At worst, the campaign was

61. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
62. Id. at 639 (quoting Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1823
(1994)).
63. See id. at 642.
64. See id. at 644-45.
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just one of many efforts by interest groups to influence the ALl. At best,
it was public and principled and subjected to scrutiny in a way that behind-the-scenes politicking often is not. Because the "get out the vote"
campaign was undertaken in public, insurance companies had to offer
reasons for their opposition to section 215, reasons that could then be
debated within the ALI. The industry's campaign thus contributed to the
operation of the marketplace of ideas within the ALL. Behind-the-scenes
politicking need not be principled or contribute to debate precisely because it occurs out of public view. The "get out the vote" campaign is
therefore less troubling than the activity discussed by Schwartz and
Scott.0
If the public nature of the campaign prevented the industry from
being unprincipled, there might still be a fear that the industry would
use its economic power to defeat section 215. It is one thing to have arguments. It is another thing to have arguments that convince people to
vote in support of one's position. Threats to retaliate against lawyers
who voted in favor of section 215 could encourage many members to
endorse the industry's position even though they found its arguments
unconvincing. In social choice processes, economic power can convert
losing arguments into winners.
Insofar as I am aware, the concern just discussed is entirely hypothetical. No threats were made. Nor could threats easily have been carried out. The ALI does not record how individual members vote. To
take revenge on lawyers who voted for section 215, the industry would
have needed a web of spies on the floor of the ALI. To my knowledge,
the industry had no one there taking names.
Readers prone to compare the insurance industry to the Soviet
KGB may not be reassured by my representations. They may suspect
the industry of planting spies in secret. Fine. Let's indulge that hypothesis. Suppose the industry did have spies. What then? In this age of
technological wizardry, surely the ALI could preserve confidentiality by
allowing members to vote in secret. Shouldn't the Institute try such expedients before criticizing the insurance industry for contributing to the
free flow of ideas?
Schwartz and Scott's social choice analysis also forces one to consider the possibility that another organized interest had captured the
committee working on the Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers
before the insurance industry became active, the other interest being the
organized bar. Lawyers dominate the ALI. Lawyers also profit from
65. See id. at 650-52.
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professionalism rules that force purchasers of legal services to spend
more. It was therefore strongly in the interest of the bar to ensure that
the Restatement included rules requiring bulk purchasers like insurance
companies to be generous.6
Coincidentally, the Restatement was in production at precisely the
time insurance companies began subjecting defense lawyers to managed
care regimes. After insurers successfully used innovative arrangements
to encourage doctors to reduce medical costs, they began attacking defense costs. They had to. Legal costs were rising at double-digit rates.
To moderate future increases, liability carriers began using fixed fees,
budgets, itemized billing statements, audits, cross-firm comparisons,
work concentrations, outside counsel guidelines, and bigger staff counsel operations. These developments hurt defense lawyers and plaintiffs'
attorneys by making it cheaper for carriers to defend claims. Because
managed care is bad for lawyers' finances, a committee dominated by
the organized bar would naturally oppose it.
The content of section 215 is consistent with the hypothesis that a
desire to force insurance companies to write bigger checks to lawyers
was at work. The section enables defense lawyers to use duties to policyholders to gain leverage over insurers. Paragraph (1) would condition
all third-party payor relationships on client consent given "with knowledge of the circumstances and conditions of the payment." 67 With this
provision in place, a defense lawyer would have to sit down with a policyholder and explain the proposed compensation arrangement in some
detail. If the policyholder withheld approval, for example, out of fear
that a budget or fixed fee arrangement interfered with the lawyer's independent judgment,.6 the lawyer could then use the policyholder's decision to pressure the insurer to spend more. The insurance company
would then be forced to deny a defense and risk a bad faith claim, to argue with the policyholder, or to provide a costlier defense.
This is an unenviable position for an insurer to be in. It is also a
predicament the Reporters seem to go out of their way to create. There
66. Others have also argued that the domination of the ALI by lawyers and law professors
leads to products that advance the economic interests of these groups. See Larry E. Ribstein, The
MandatoryNature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1020-30 (1993).
67. RESTATEmENT (THtRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215(1) (Council Draft No.
13, 1997).
68. See id. § 215 cmt. b. The Supreme Court of Kentucky prohibited insurance companies
from using fixed fees on this ground. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d
568, 572 (Ky. 1996). For a critique of this decision, see Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: UnnecessaryCasualtiesin the ContinuingBattle over the Law Governing InsuranceDefense
Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205 (1997-1998).
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is no general basis for conditioning a defense lawyer's representation on
an insured's informed consent to a payment structure. Lawyers rarely, if
ever, obtain such consent today, and they are usually right to ignore the
matter. Few insureds have reason to care about compensation arrangements. In most cases, insurance companies bear all defense and indemnity costs. 9 Consequently, it is a matter of indifference to insureds
how their lawyers are paid. Nor do the Reporters cite a case in which a
defense lawyer was disciplined or found liable in malpractice for failing
to discuss the terms of compensation with an insured, and I am aware of
none. Given the lack of analytical and case support, one can only wonder why the requirement is in section 215. A possibility is that its purpose is to impede insurers' efforts to control defense costs.
Illustration 4 to section 215 continues the theme. It asks whether a
defense lawyer who recommends taking additional depositions at an expected cost of $5,000 can honor a carrier's rejection of the request. The
answer is a qualified "yes." The lawyer can acquiesce if and only if he
"reasonably believes that the additional depositions can be forgone
without violating [a] duty of competent representation owed by [the]
Lawyer to [the] Policyholder." The lawyer is supposed to consider
whether it would be an act of malpractice against the insured to forgo
the depositions.
One problem with this answer is that it lacks case support. Policyholders have held defense lawyers liable for malpractice on several
grounds but, insofar as I am aware, never for honoring an insurer's rejection of recommended services. None of the cases cited in the reporter's note makes this point.7 ' A second problem is that a defense
lawyer who abides by a carrier's decision should bear no liability to a
policyholder. When it comes to spending clients' money, lawyers are
advisors, not decision-makers (except when their clients want them to
be). By recommending that the depositions be taken, the lawyer did his
job and, one may suppose, exercised the required level of care. As a client, the carrier is entitled to make up its own mind. If the carrier
wrongly rejects the recommendation and thereby harms the insured, the
insured's proper and sole remedy should be an action against the carrier

69. This requirement may be appropriate in specific cases, e.g., when insureds are required
to cover defense costs up to the limit of a deductible, or when insureds are covered by defensewithin-limits policies.
70. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW GovmtiNm LAWYERS § 215 cmt. f, illus. 5
(Council Draft No. 13, 1997).
71. See id. § 215 reporter's note.
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for negligently handling the defense. 2 Having made the right recommendation, the lawyer should be liable to no one.
By subjecting the lawyer to liability for failing to convince the insurer to spend more lavishly, the Restatement would undermine the insurer's contractual right of control, which includes the right to decide
whether and how money is to be spent. It would also discourage defense
lawyers from providing accurate advice. To appreciate these effects,
consider the lawyer's options after the carrier rejects his recommendation. The lawyer may acquiesce, threaten to withdraw unless the carrier
changes its mind, or ask the policyholder to pay for the depositions."
The first option forces the lawyer to run the risk of being sued for
malpractice by the insured. Predictably, the lawyer will be unhappy in
this situation and will be angry with the carrier for saving its own
money at the lawyer's expense. To make matters worse, the lawyer will
have set himself up for the policyholder's malpractice claim by recommending that the depositions be taken. A strategic lawyer will therefore
think twice before making suggestions that cost money. At some point
in time, self-interest will lead such a lawyer not to make a recommendation that should be made, thereby denying the insurer the benefit of
the lawyer's candid advice and depriving the insured of competent representation. The possibility that this strategic conduct may result in a
malpractice suit brought by the carrier or the insured shows that there is
no safe harbor for defense lawyers, not that the problem is solved.
The second option forces the carrier to find a new lawyer or reverse its decision. Discharging the lawyer will signal the insured that
something is wrong and will set the insurer up for a bad faith claim in
which its former lawyer, now disgruntled, is set to testify against it. The
second alternative will result in the carrier spending more on legal
services than it thinks it should. Neither outcome is pretty.
The third option, asking the policyholder to pay, will create bad
blood between the carrier and the insured. The carrier will have made its
decision and want to stick to it. The policyholder will want the carrier to
pay for the depositions. The policyholder may even charge the carrier
with attempting to transfer defense costs back to the policyholder by
strategically refusing to pay for services that the liability contract obli72. The case law on this cause of action is well-developed. See Joseph E. Edwards, Annotation, Liability Insurer'sNegligence or Bad Faith in Conducting Defense as Ground of Liability to
Insured, 34 A.L.R.3d 533 (1970 & Supp. 1997).
73. I rule out the possibility, which seems ludicrous to me, that the lawyer must take the
depositions at his own expense. Lawyers do not generally have to perform services for which clients refuse to pay.
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gates it to provide. If the carrier gives in, it will lose control of the defense. If it holds fast, it will have set itself up for a bad faith claim.
The long and short of it is that section 215 would make it more
difficult for insurers to use their contractual right to control the defense
to reduce legal costs. It would do this by enabling defense lawyers to
use obligations to policyholders as sources of leverage over insurers. It
is not clear that policyholders would benefit in this situation. Policyholders have to pay higher premiums when defense costs rise. But lawyers would be better off.
Schwartz and Scott's social choice approach may also explain why
the Reporters abandoned or moderated some of their more reformminded positions after the insurance industry mobilized its forces.
Schwartz and Scott predict that Restatements will tend to maintain the
status quo when organized groups with conflicting interests compete for
members' support.74 If the organized bar once had sole control of the
committee overseeing the Restatement, it lost that when the insurance
industry contacted large numbers of lawyers with economic ties to it.
Thereafter, the Reporters retreated to a position closer to the status quo.
All of this is conjecture. I have not studied interest group activity
in the ALI, and I do not pretend to know what drove Professors Morgan
and Wolfram to their earlier or more recent positions. However, there is
another implication of the social choice approach that seems to be one
of hard fact. It is that Restatements are not scholarly works but are instead more like statutes, regulations, and other political outputs.
To me, scholarship involves commitments to honesty, factual accuracy, and analytical rigor. By offering a document as a scholarly work, I
affirm my belief in the truth and soundness of the statements it contains.
For example, if I state without qualification that A logically implies B,
or that A is a true proposition of law, readers are entitled to infer that I
believe these assertions and to criticize me if I am wrong. Readers are
also entitled to criticize me for ducking subjects that an intellectually
honest scholar would have addressed. For example, if I were to sidestep
an issue for fear of angering a client or prejudicing a client's case, other
scholars would be justified in pointing out my sin of omission.
Schwartz and Scott's social choice analysis suggests that Restatements often may not qualify as scholarship under this definition. They
may contain propositions that some or many of their authors disbelieve,
and they may omit material for inappropriate reasons. The authors of a
Restatement include the Reporters and other ALI members who partici74. See Schwartz & Scott, supranote 61, at 636-37.
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pate in the review process that precedes final approval. All of these persons are authors because Restatements are published as having been
"adopted and promulgated" by the ALI as a whole. 75 But no single
member controls the content of a Restatement or is likely to agree with
everything in it. The Reporters draft the text, but the Advisers, the
Council, and the members can modify or reject their positions. A disgruntled Reporter can fight internally to restore language originally proposed, but the decision to fight is up to the Reporter and there is no
guarantee of success. Consequently, although the ALI stands behind a
Restatement, no individual may be willing to vouch for the entire package in the manner that an author vouches for the whole of a scholarly
work.
The review process may also encourage Reporters to act strategically. A Reporter who believes that Proposition A is correct but who
fears that the Advisers, the Council, or the members will reject any text
expressing it must decide whether to play the game straight or to
strategize. Strategizing may include leaving out Proposition A or proposing Proposition A' that is more ambiguous than A but also more
likely to get through. The path taken is up to the Reporter, but the desire
to produce a document that secures final approval will always push toward consensus and away from controversy.
Fractured control of content and interest group capture are more
likely to produce compromises than good scholarship, which is why I
say that Restatements may resemble legislative products more so than
scholarly works. This is not to deny that some Restatements may be
quite scholarly. A Reporter who insists on conceptual clarity and analytical rigor may do wonderful work. The point is that Reporters will
feel pressure to compromise and that how they react to this pressure is
up to them. Some may stick to their guns, not caring whether the ALI
gives its stamp of approval to their work. One wonders how often persons with this personality trait are asked to serve as Reporters. Others
may yield on many points for the sake of bringing a project to a close.
The latter group may include many scholars who compromise without
intending to do so. People do not always realize when incentives have
corrupted their judgment.
The ALI claims to produce scholarship, not legislation. The motion
to found the ALI stated that its "object 'shall be ...to encourage and
carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.' ''76 The organization also

75. See id. at 596.
76. Id. at 603 n.20 (quoting William Draper Lewis, History of The American Law Institute
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compares itself to scientific "institutions founded to investigate the
cause of disease. 7 7 I doubt the accuracy of this characterization. To me,
the ALI looks more like a private legislature. It uses social choice processes to turn out products, and it makes value-laden choices on policy
matters where there is nothing approaching a consensus on right answers.
Still, the fact that the ALI sees itself as a scholarly institution
probably explains why the insurance industry's campaign against section 215 caused as much uproar as it did. When it comes to matters of
truth and principle, an academic organization is poorly served by being
portrayed in public as a forum for interest group activity. An overt campaign to manipulate a vote would cause people to wonder how deeply
devoted to scholarship the ALI really is. In turn, such questions would
diminish the ALI's prestige, making the organization less influential
and membership in it less valuable. Members therefore sought to preserve the ALI's scholarly image by condemning the insurance industry's "get out the vote" campaign.
Some ALI members who are law professors complained loudest of
all. One reportedly compared insurance companies to the tobacco industry. As a participant in the State of Texas's lawsuit against Big Tobacco,
I can say with authority that the analogy is strained. That law professors
engaged in rhetorical excess does not surprise me, however, and not just
because my colleagues engage in it all the time. Law professors have a
great deal at stake in the ALI's reputation as a scholarly institution. If
the ALI comes to be seen as a place where the Business Roundtable, the
American Insurance Association, the American Trial Lawyers Association, and other interest groups pursue policy agendas, the professoriat
will wonder why legal academics are giving political bargains the stamp
of scholarly approval. That is a question law professors who are actively
involved in the ALI may not want to have asked.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Paraphrasing Clemenceau, law has become much too serious a
thing to be left to lawyers. Organized groups have significant financial
interests in law. When it is to their advantage to find ways to influence
the ALI, they will do so. The ALI's tradition of leaving clients at the

and the FirstRestatement of the Law: "How We Did It," in RESTATEMENT iN THE COURTS 1, 3

(1945)).
77. See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organizationfor the
Improvement of the Law Proposingan American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PRoc. 1, 65 (1923).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss3/11

26

Silver: The Lost World: Of Politics and Getting the Law Right
1998]

THE LOST WORLD

799

door will not stop them. Nor will hortatory ethics rules.
If the ALI is intent on keeping its current structure, it should drop
the pretense of being insulated from politics and should present itself to
the world as a source of legislation that is sophisticated, if not exactly
scholarly. Otherwise, it should consider making radical reforms, such as
eliminating voting processes and forbidding Reporters from accepting
consultancies relating to their projects. No reform, however, is likely to
insulate the ALI completely as long as it continues to admit members,
including law professors, with economic ties to interest groups. The
stakes have become too large to expect self-interested groups to exercise restraint, especially, but not only, when the ALI threatens to upset
the status quo by endorsing reformist positions. If you are inclined to
think otherwise, there's a Jurassic Park in the Amazon that I'd like to
sell you.
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